Research
I fit somewhat uncomfortably in armchairs.
Overview
Much contemporary philosophy of mind takes either an introspectionist or empiricist approach. The former takes the deliverances of introspection as the core phenomena for philosophical theorizing, while the latter endeavors to reduce mental categories to kinds identified by the cognitive sciences.
In my work, I start with the mental as it shows up in folk psychology, which is neither especially introspective, nor constrained to the kinds uncovered by the cognitive sciences. This approach was favored by P.F. Strawson, and other descriptive metaphysicians, but the project looks very different now, in light of the empirical work on social cognition over the last fifty years.
My dissertation—'Understanding Minds: Essays on Social Cognition'—treats the problem of other minds from this perspective, with some surprising results. Among them, I argue that we perceive agency, but not mental states, that perception immediately justifies beliefs that outstrip how things are perceptually presented, and that the personal–subpersonal distinction is a psychological construction.
After defending my dissertation, I plan to pursue accounts of more 'sophisticated' knowledge of the mental—introspection and empathy—as well as develop my constructivist account of the personal, especially as it relates to the normative.
Publications
Other Minds Are Neither Seen Nor Inferred Synthese (2020)
Papers in Progress
[Title Witheld to Preserve Blind Review] Revise and Resubmit, Mind and Language
A paper about perception.
[Title Witheld to Preserve Blind Review]
A paper about the epistemology of perception.
[Title Witheld to Preserve Blind Review]
A paper about the personal–subpersonal distinction.
Polarization is Epistemically Innocuous
A paper about the epistemology of polarization. I argue that polarization is often epistemically innocuous, and in fact has some underappreciated epistemic benefits.
Presentations (Selected)
Perceiving Agency
Society for Philosophy and Psychology, June 2021
Polarization is Epistemically Innocuous
Canadian Philosophical Association, June 2021
A Constructivist Account of the Personal–Subpersonal Distinction
APA Pacific Division, April 2021
Animacy as Perceived Agency
Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, December 2020
The Epistemology of Looks
APA Eastern Division, January 2020 (Handout)
Perceiving Animacy
The Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society & the Mind Association, July 2019
The Personal–Subpersonal Distinction and Social Cognition
Society for Philosophy and Psychology, July 2019
Ampliative Perceptual Judgments and Other Minds
Canadian Philosophical Association: Annual Congress, June 2019 (Handout)
Other Minds are Neither Seen Nor Inferred
APA Eastern Division, January 2019